

WAS THE SURGE STRATEGY RIGHT?

BY

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

WAS THE SURGE STRATEGY RIGHT?

by

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ABSTRACT

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The decrease in violence and the recent successes enjoyed in Operation Iraqi Freedom are presumably due to the “surge strategy”. This research project examines whether or not the increase in American Soldiers in Iraq was needed. My argument is that the “Sons of Iraq” program (or Sahwa) was the major contributing factor for the successes in Iraq (along with other parts of the so called surge strategy). Determining whether or not the surge (in American combat power) strategy enabled the Sahwa to be effective, or if the program would have been effective without the increase is important. If the additional American combat power was not needed in Iraq, those forces could have been better used in other parts of the world (Afghanistan), could have enjoyed greater dwell time (meaning that they would have been better trained and less stressed), and the defense supplemental budget could have been either decreased or spent on other priorities. If the Sahwa could have been effective in achieving the success now seen in Iraq, what should the strategy have been to enable this result?

WAS THE SURGE STRATEGY RIGHT?

On January 10, 2007, President George W. Bush announced that he would deploy five additional combat brigades as part of a new strategy to win in Iraq. This equated to the deployment of about 50,000 US Soldiers, Marines, Airmen, Sailors, and contractors, a significant increase in the operational tempo of the US Army, and an estimated 13 billion dollars of taxpayer money.¹ The increase in United States combat forces was only part of the new strategy commonly referred to as “the new way forward.” Because of the deployment of thousands of American troops, the press coined the strategy as “the surge strategy”. The purpose of this paper is to prove that the increase in US combat power was not necessary for the successful implementation of the new strategy because the administration made mistakes in defining the strategic environment and severely overlooked an aspect of available capability that was resident in Iraq at the time. This capability was a movement called the Sahwa, or “awakening movement” and the Sons of Iraq program.

Stability in Iraq was inevitable through limited US and coalition involvement and support to this movement. A quick look through Iraq’s history would have given some insight into this capability. William McCallister summarizes this history in his study of irregular warfare. He says that the idea of forming neighborhood watches in Iraq is not new. Since its very foundation, Iraq has been secured and defended by its citizens. Baghdad was divided into quarters based around a mosque and the quarters’ influential and powerful inhabitants. These areas were defended by its young men who were organized into groups that were expected to defend them. These groups not only provided for the security of the quarter, but were called on to maintain the quarters’

“moral ideal”. Furthermore, they were called on to support government forces in other parts of the city.²

It is not difficult to compare and equate today’s tribal Sahwa with the centuries old Iraqi manner of security and prosperity. Today, the powerful and influential tribal leaders have dictated that security be established and maintained by members of their tribes and neighborhoods. Once this step was made, the Iraqi government mandated that these groups be accounted for and vetted through their system of government and, eventually became part of the governmental establishment. The Sons of Iraq were required to submit biographical data of its members to the Iraqi government. They were also called upon to join the Iraqi Security Forces in order to provide a larger, regional role of security.

Although security through involvement of tribal influence as well as governmental control was inevitable, the surge in US combat power hastened the inevitability. To be clear, the purpose of this paper is to prove that ADDITIONAL US forces were not necessary in Iraq, it is not to argue that US forces were not needed at all. US and coalition combat power were required for the Sahwa to be effective. Al Qaeda in Iraq and various other extremist groups had too strong a hold in most areas in Iraq for unorganized tribal groups to gain an upper hand in establishing and maintaining their own security. Once security had been established through US combat power and cooperation with local security groups, maintenance of regional security was manageable on the neighborhood and local governance level. The hastening of inevitability of security through tribal influence refers to larger areas being covered more quickly by having more US combat power on the ground in support of this movement.

However, the relative stability currently seen in Iraq would have eventually come about if the surge of combat brigades had not happened. Had the US strategy been to “quarter the cities”, secure one area at a time, put tribal security groups in place, then move to another area, it may have taken several more months to realize the gains in security made but it would have saved billions of dollars and Army operational tempo by not deploying more brigades. The relative stability currently seen in Iraq would have come in six months or less had the surge of US combat power not happened.

In this paper, I will discuss the chronology of US strategy shifts, their definitions, and the reasons for the shifts. Next, I will examine the background of the Sahwa movement as it relates throughout history as well as in the current strategic environment as supporting evidence that stability in Iraq was inevitable because of this movement. Lastly, I will define the strategic environment for each of three phases that I believe are critical to examine – the actual invasion in March 2003, the post-invasion period from 2003-2006, and the current phase from 2007-present and why the administration made crucial mistakes in defining the strategic environment.

Chronology of US Strategy Shifts in Iraq, Their Definitions, and the Reasons for the Shifts

In order to assess the effectiveness of the current strategy in Iraq, one must first understand the strategy, the previous strategy, and the timeline associated with the shift. One must also understand the reasons why the shift was needed. This project concentrates on the part of the strategy dealing with security. Without security, no other lines of operation can be effective, thus rendering the goals of the strategy unreachable. By other lines of operation I am referring to other elements of national power, or the Department of Defense, operating along one line to a stated objective. In Iraq, some of

the lines of operations included governance, economic development, and security. Although the Department of Defense, and more specifically Multi-National Corps-Iraq, had overall lead for all of these lines of operations, it had sole responsibility for the security line. Department of State and other elements of national power worked in partnership to lend their expertise in covering the other lines.

Previous Strategy. In November 2005, President Bush announced the publication of the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq. This strategy had three elements: political, economic, and security. The political element of the strategy concentrated on isolating enemy elements from others outside the political process, then engaging those others to join the process, then building national institutions. The economic element of the strategy was defined as restoring infrastructure, reforming the economy, and building the capacity to maintain these. The security element of the strategy was defined as combined (coalition) operations to clear areas of enemy control, let Iraqi Security Forces [ISF] hold those areas, and build ISF and local institutions to provide for their people.³

In dissecting the security element of the strategy, one comes to see that it is manpower intensive. “Successful COIN operations often require a high ratio of security forces to the protected population.”⁴ In order to clear every house, of every neighborhood, of every city in Iraq is a huge undertaking. The definition of “hold” is “to maintain or retain possession by force.”⁵ This takes as many, if not more, security forces as it does to “clear”. With the additional tasks of building ISF and the capacity of local institutions to deliver services, advance the rule of law, and nurture civil society,⁶ it is obvious that the more security forces available, the better.

Reasons for the Strategy Shift. In December 2006, the Iraq Study Group published its report on its assessment and recommendations for Iraq. The members of the group presented recommendations because “we believe there is a better way forward.”⁷ Through their research into the war, they concluded that “there are neither enough US troops present nor enough support from Iraqi security forces to “hold” neighborhoods so cleared”.⁸ The report also states that “current US policy is not working” and cited the significant increase in violence as evidence that the Iraq government not functioning.⁹ Also in December 2006, President Bush first announced that the United States was not winning the war in Iraq and he was searching for a new strategy in Iraq.¹⁰

Current Strategy. Since there were not enough security forces to secure the population and execute the strategy of clear, hold, build and we were not winning the war, there had to be a strategy shift. That shift occurred in January 2007. The White House released both a fact sheet on a new way forward in Iraq and a briefing with highlights of the Iraq Strategy Review by the National Security Council. The way forward outlines the current national strategy for Iraq and is

rooted in six fundamental elements: let the Iraqis lead; help Iraqis protect the population; isolate extremists; create space for political progress; diversify political and economic efforts; and situate the strategy in a regional approach.¹¹

The key facets of the security element of the strategy are an acknowledgement that population security is necessary for success, that the US would provide additional resources to accomplish population security, that the US would support tribes willing to help Iraqis fight Al Qaeda, plan and fund an eventual demobilization of militias, accelerate ISF transition, and increase ISF capacity.¹² This seems to be the first

acknowledgement of the role of the tribal influence. This tribal influence came in the form of awakening movements, Sahwa, and the Sons of Iraq program. Awakening movements refer to a regional shift in thought by large portions of the population that security and stability were more important than fighting the American occupation. The Sahwa refers to tribal leaders actually directing action against Al Qaeda, extremists, and criminal and secular activity. The Sons of Iraq program was initially an American program in which local men would take up arms against purveyors of instability. These groups were initially called concerned local citizens and were supported by, but not paid by US forces. The SOI program was later instituted and many of the groups were paid wages by American officials.

The part of the strategy “provide additional military... resources to accomplish” population security stemmed directly from the fact that the US did not have enough forces to accomplish the clear, hold, build strategy. In the current strategy, there is no mention of US forces clearing or holding terrain, it talks only about helping Iraqis protect the population, and training Iraqi Security Forces. The addition of US combat brigades could simply have been the administration reacting to the Iraq Study Group report and not fully understanding the burgeoning security effort of the Sahwa. So, the “surge strategy” was created by the media because it meant that thousands more Americans would deploy. But it did not take into account the other elements of the strategy.

If the addition of more US combat power to Iraq stemmed from a reaction to the Iraq Study Group report, it is logical to assume that the administration did not fully understand the strategic environment in Iraq. In order to understand if this was the case, it is necessary to fully define the strategic environment during each of three phases of

the Iraq war (invasion, post-invasion 2003-2006, new way ahead 2006-2008). However, first a short explanation of awakening movements is necessary in order to understand the how they could have impacted on the strategic environment and ultimately on our national strategy.

Chronology of “Awakening Movements” or Sahwa. An awakening movement (aka Sahwa, aka Sons of Iraq program, aka Concerned Local Citizen program, aka neighborhood watch program) is any movement by a group or groups of Iraqi citizens who have decided to assume some degree of responsibility for their own security. Many of these movements have involved alliances with US and coalition forces, many have allied with Iraqi Security Forces, some have shunned all alliances and have taken on security for themselves. These groups allied themselves with security forces and/or took on the responsibility for security themselves because they had been alienated by religious zealots.¹³ These religious zealots were Al Qaeda fighters as well as radical extremist “insurgent” groups. The Sons of Iraq program developed by US forces was never designed to be a permanent solution, “but rather a necessary but temporary measure meant to help Coalition and Iraqi Security Forces move forward in delivering security.”¹⁴

There are currently around 80,000 members of Sahwa groups in Iraq.¹⁵ The effects that these groups have had on the security in Iraq have been astounding. In a Washington Post article in February 2008, Amit Paley quotes several seized documents as well as personal communications with Al Qaeda in Iraq leaders that the Sons of Iraq have had an enormous impact on Al Qaeda’s ability to conduct attacks. The article cites

a demoralized and broken Al Qaeda in Iraq and attributes the demise to the Sons of Iraq.¹⁶

These awakenings are not happenstance, rather a concerted effort by Sunni tribal leaders, coalition forces and, to some extent, Iraqi Security Forces. In most places, these awakenings could not have happened without the support of professional security forces with logistical, manpower, and technical support.

Al Anbar Province. In Al Anbar, as with many regions in Iraq, “Sunni insurgents and foreign Sunni Al Qaeda fighters... had formed a strategic... alliance against what was perceived as an occupation by the United States.”¹⁷ Prior to the summer of 2006, Anbar Province, and specifically its capital Ramadi, was widely considered unwinnable. Due to a combination of strategic mistakes by the Al Qaeda fighters however, exhausting work by US forces in counterinsurgency-type operations, and the eventual support of Sunni tribesmen, Anbar Province became one of the safest places in Iraq and a model for provincial security.

The strategic mistakes by Al Qaeda were that they disenfranchised the local population as well as their allied Sunni leaders, led their fragile alliance with Sunni insurgents by intimidation, and “slowly but surely began taking control of money-making activities traditionally held by the tribes.”¹⁸ At first, Al Qaeda intended to wage an insurgency type of warfare and provide for security against the “occupation forces,” but the alliance began to erode in 2005 when local tribal leaders began to ally themselves with coalition forces.

The work of US forces in Al Anbar was mostly just good, basic counterinsurgency- type operations. Sensing the growing rift between Al Qaeda and

Sunni tribesmen, the Soldiers and Marines began to move in among the local population to provide for their security and began increased precision attacks on Al Qaeda strongholds. Once the population saw the intent of US forces, and the US forces saw the intent of the Sunni tribe fighters, the US-Sunni alliance grew stronger. Sheik Abd al Sittar Reesha said this best: "Our American friends had not understood us when they came. They were proud, stubborn people and so were we."¹⁹

The eventual support of the Sunni tribal leaders came with the public announcement by several tribal leaders in Anbar that they have allied with coalition and Iraqi Security Forces against Al Qaeda. These leaders built what may be called militias – thousands of men who took up arms in defense of their neighborhoods as well as offensive operations against Al Qaeda. The recognized "leader" of the Sahwa, Sheik Sittar Reesha, built a strong alliance with US forces and, according to the II Marine Expeditionary Force G5, "in Sittar's office, there are two flags – one is Iraqi, the other is American."²⁰

Diyala Province. Due to the published US strategy of increasing US forces in Baghdad, Al Qaeda began systematically moving its forces from Baghdad to the "Baghdad belt". The Baghdad belt was described as those areas surrounding the city of Baghdad where Al Qaeda and other extremists fell back to regroup and wait out the American surge. From these areas, the enemy could train and equip its forces, launch attacks into Baghdad, as well as gain stronger footholds in surrounding provinces. One of these locations was Diyala Province and, specifically Baqubah, its capital. Baqubah was once proclaimed the capital of the Islamic State of Iraq by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Once the United States confirmed that Zarqawi was killed in an airstrike in Baqubah,

they immediately began to transition responsibility to Iraqi Security Forces before they were ready to take on that responsibility. This happened at about the same time as the movement of Al Qaeda from Baghdad. Since there was relatively little US presence in Diyala Province and the Iraqi Security Forces were thin and inadequately trained and supported, Al Qaeda became fully entrenched in the province. "Over 2000 plus al Qaeda are thought to have fled to the province since the inception of the Baghdad Security Plan in mid February, and the security situation has markedly decreased since then."²¹ Al Qaeda used the province for a training ground and a safe haven to launch attacks into Baghdad.

Similar to what occurred in Anbar, the local Sunni leaders entered into an alliance of convenience with Al Qaeda – defending their province from the occupation forces of America. Because of an increase in violence and a realization that Al Qaeda was forming safe havens in Diyala Province, a US Brigade Combat Team was deployed into the area. The alliance of Al Qaeda and Sunni resistance against the occupiers was fierce and, not unlike Anbar, seemed unwinnable. Al Qaeda fought in a classic insurgency style – attacking US forces to get an overwhelming response thus marking the occupiers as the true enemy. The leader of the Sahwa in Baqubah once remarked that he had killed Americans. He said that he did what any self-respecting man would do if an armed force occupied his land – his own neighborhood. He said he fought Americans because he thought he must, he did not understand our intentions. Then, when the alliance between Al Qaeda and his Sunni resistance deteriorated, and he allied his group with American forces, he understood why we were there and the alliance blossomed.

The New Way Forward strategy that brought more US forces to Iraq enabled the Corps commander to provide an additional battalion (and eventually another BCT) to Baqubah. This enabled US forces to live amongst the population and secure them from within. It also enabled the alliance with the Sahwa. Eventually, the Sahwa maintained security of Baqubah with only minor support from US forces or ISF. This allowed US forces to concentrate on training Iraqi police and Army in order for them to take over the security mission from the Sahwa. Most members of the Sahwa joined because of the promise of an opportunity to serve in the ISF.

Revisiting the previous strategy of clear, hold, build, one can see that not enough forces were available to accomplish that in Diyala and specifically its capital. In and amongst a city of over 300,000 residents, a single Brigade Combat Team could not have quelled burgeoning violence without supporting local forces. However, instituting a Sons of Iraq Program and allying with local security forces allowed it to take place in a relatively short period of time.

Baghdad and Beyond. Prior to 2006, Al Qaeda was absolutely winning the information war. They understood how to influence the Iraqi population against US presence. This was the main reason why the awakening movements took so long to spread – Iraqis believed Al Qaeda rhetoric that Americans were there only to occupy Iraq and to steal its resources. Only out of necessity did the Anbar and Diyala movements begin (due to the strategic mistakes of Al Qaeda). Tribal leaders, tiring of the violence and Al Qaeda's extremism, timidly aligned with US forces to try to change the security environment. Once there were successful movements in Anbar and Diyala,

news spread of the cooperation and even the intentions of US forces and the movements exploded throughout Baghdad and other troubled areas of the country.

One could say that the movement gained traction because of a better understanding of the strategic environment of tribal leaders. The other part of the equation was that US forces, down to the lowest levels, began to have a different understanding of the strategic environment as well. Because the so-called rejectionists had been labeled “enemy” in the national strategy, US Soldiers had difficulty in allying themselves with this incredible capability. Once they understood the benefits of the relationship, one could say that US forces also went through an “awakening” movement.

Defining the Strategic Environment

Defining the strategic environment for Iraq in each of three phases (invasion, post-invasion 2003-2006, new way ahead 2007-2008), refers to US goals, objectives, strategies, capabilities, measures of effectiveness, and the enemy. As goals, objectives, and strategies have been discussed to some extent, I will concentrate on the capabilities required, capabilities available and, to a lesser extent, the measures of effectiveness.

Invasion Phase. The president’s stated goals for invading Iraq were “to disarm the country of its WMD, to end Saddam Hussein’s support for terrorism, and to free the Iraqi people.”²² These objectives seem very simple to achieve when taking into account the capabilities and measures of effectiveness. The capabilities were a coalition of over 40 nations (somewhere between 45-49)²³, the entire US military, and a group capable of leading Iraq into a democratic process under Ahmed Abdel Hadi Chalabi. The enemy was similarly simple – Saddam Hussein and his army. The strategy was to attack Iraq’s

army with overwhelming force and replace the Saddam Hussein regime with Chalabi's. The measures of effectiveness were: a free and stable Iraq without access to weapons of mass destruction and that does not sponsor terrorism. It is plain to see that the strategic environment was quite simple and that US strategy, married with its capabilities, matched US objectives. However, there was one major problem with one of our measures of effectiveness – a stable Iraq. Iraq was spinning out of control with widespread looting, ethnic fighting, and insurgent activity. Since the strategic environment had changed, US strategy had to change and, as previously mentioned, the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq was published in 2005.

Post-invasion (2003-2006). Appropriately, the US redefined the strategic environment in Iraq. The objectives had changed from very specific, definable, short term objective - disarm the country of its WMD - to more broad-based, subjective objectives: "Iraq is peaceful, stable, and secure, well integrated into the international community, and a full partner in the global war on terrorism."²⁴ The enemy had changed immensely. President Bush categorized them as rejectionists, former regime loyalists, and terrorists.²⁵ This does not completely define the enemy within the strategic environment. This definition completely discounted the impact that ethnic fighting had in derailing our stated objectives. However, for the sake of this argument, it will be assumed as true.

The actual size of the security force had increased over time during this phase. One of the main objectives of US forces was to train the Iraqi Security Forces. All over the country, Iraqi Security Forces were stepping up to the challenge and integrating into the security environment. However, many of these forces were infiltrated by al Qaeda

and other religious and secular extremists and could not always be counted on.

Additionally, the coalition dwindled²⁶ somewhat and the Department of Defense realized it needed to go into a rotational deployment in order for it to be capable of waging what Secretary Rumsfeld called the long war.²⁷ The available capabilities had decreased but the strategic environment required additional capabilities to fight an insurgency-type conflict. Because of the deployment rotation, there were less US forces available. These forces were tasked to do more than the larger invasion force. In addition to training the Iraqi Security Forces, they were expected to clear large swaths of densely populated areas, hold those large areas, then build infrastructure, governance, and the economy.

The strategy, as discussed previously, went along the lines of political (isolate, engage, build), economic (restore, reform, build), and security (clear, hold, build). Some of the measures of effectiveness were: number of ISF units trained; number of areas cleared and held; amount of essential services rendered; elections held; and levels of violence. Some of these measures were simply wrong and the strategic environment changed well before the strategy shift in 2006.

Post New Way Forward (2007-2008). Although the National Security Council stated that US objectives in Iraq remain the same, the worded objective was a little different: "A unified democratic federal Iraq that can govern itself, defend itself, and sustain itself, and is an ally in the War on Terror."²⁸ The enemy had been redefined to something that looked more like reality in the previous phase. The assumption in the previous phase was one based on a Sunni insurgency (the rejectionists as President Bush defined them); the assumption in this phase is an enemy of violent extremists and sectarianism.

The United States made its biggest mistake in defining the strategic environment in not understanding the capabilities it had available. The capabilities required remained the same, the basic strategy was not entirely different from the previous one, but the available capabilities were severely misjudged. In 2006, well prior to the strategy shift based on redefining the strategic environment, the previously referred to “rejectionists” stepped up as an available capability. It should not have been difficult to recognize this as an asset. The National Strategy for Victory in Iraq even mentions that this would become an eventual asset – “We judge that over time many in this group [rejectionists] will increasingly support a democratic Iraq provided that the federal government protects minority rights and the legitimate interests of all communities.”²⁹ Perhaps the strategists did not believe the time was right for the rejectionists to become an available capability because they did not believe that the Iraqi government was doing its job of protecting the rights of all communities. The strategists also did not recognize the impact of the growing Sahwa movement and, therefore, did not understand the capability the movement brought with it.

Conclusion

If one were to now look at the title of this project, one could deduce that although the surge strategy was right in many ways, it was definitely not necessary to deploy five more combat brigades to Iraq, as well as the associated support troops, at a cost of around thirteen billion dollars. Because of the miscalculation of the strategic environment, not only did the administration waste tax payer dollars but the operational tempo of the Army was increased to a level that many believed would break the Army. “The decision to escalate... five more brigades... into Iraq has put additional strain on

the ground forces and threatens to leave the United States with a broken force that is unprepared to deal with other threats around the world.”³⁰

It was the one line of the Iraq Study Group report that said that there were not enough US troops to “hold neighborhoods so cleared”³¹ that was the backbone of the miscalculation that cost so dearly. Had the reviewers of the strategy understood that this line from the report was in direct response to the “old” strategy, and that it did not matter to the “new” way forward, the Department of Defense would not have had to increase the deployment levels. Had the line in the Iraq Study Group report said that “there were not enough security forces” instead, perhaps the reviewers of the strategy would have seen the effects of the Sahwa and more fully understood their impacts on the strategic environment.

Did the “surge” enable the Sahwa? Yes. However, the addition of US combat brigades was not necessary to achieve the goals of the strategy. Although at the tactical and operational levels, military leaders would never say no to additional combat power when fighting a war, it probably did not make strategic sense to deploy the additional brigades.

The Sahwa began before the Iraq Study Group report was published however; there was no mention of it in the report. Had the report investigated this movement, and made recommendations as to how to best support the movement (instead of its loftier recommendation to support national reconciliation), greater gains could have been made faster without the addition of more US combat power.

The “surge” strategy had many more facets than simply “a temporary surge (or increase) in American combat forces”. Yet this is what most Americans believe

(supported only by anecdotal evidence and Wikipedia: “The surge is a phrase commonly used to describe George W. Bush's plan to increase the number of American troops deployed to the Iraq War in order to provide security to Baghdad and Al Anbar Province”³²). The strategy, when deciphered through military channels, included “surging” into the population – living with and protecting and providing essential services to the local populace until such time as they have isolated the extremists and overcome their hold.

As stated previously, security in Iraq was always inevitable. The surge of American combat power simply hastened the inevitability. Instead of smaller areas of the country being stabilized, secured, and maintained by Iraqis, the additional combat forces allowed larger areas of the country to be stabilized. Had the additional combat power not been deployed, certainly a strategy of consolidation and saturation would have been necessary and taken somewhat longer to realize the gains of the “surge”.

Another argument that increased security was inevitable with the Sahwa is in the history of Iraq. As stated previously, tribal security has been a mainstay of Iraqi culture from its very beginning. If this type of security has been central to Iraq’s security throughout its history, it stands to reason that this type of security would inevitably come to the forefront of stabilizing the country in the aftermath of civil unrest and foreign invasion. Perhaps what was needed was a successful movement to give confidence to other local groups to step forward to provide their own security. The Al Anbar movement seemed to have provided that spark for other movements, eventually spreading to Baghdad spurring the remarkable decrease in violence.

Endnotes

¹ Congressional Budget Office Director Peter Orszag, Letter to Honorable John Spratt on estimation of cost of the President's plan to increase number of military deployed to Iraq, Washington DC, Feb 1 2007.

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³ George W. Bush, *National Strategy for Victory in Iraq* (Washington, DC: The White House, November 2005), 7-9.

⁴ US Department of the Army, *Counterinsurgency*, Army Field Manual 3-24 (Washington DC: US Department of the Army, December 2006), 1-2.

⁵ US Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, Joint Publication 1-02 (Washington DC: US Joint Chiefs of Staff, September 30, 2001), 244.

⁶ Bush, *National Strategy for Victory in Iraq*, 8.

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⁸ Ibid., 12.

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¹² Ibid.

¹³ Forook Ahmed, "Sons of Iraq and Awakening Forces", Institute for the Study of War (February 2008), 1-2.

¹⁴ Ibid, 2.

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